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INTRODUCTION TO AMICI CURIAE BRIEF IN
YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
Deborah L. Brake* and Joanna L. Grossman**
Over thirty years ago in these pages, law professor and feminist legal
scholar Wendy W. Williams famously cautioned feminists that “if we can’t
have it both ways we need to think carefully about which way we want to
have it.”1 When she wrote those words, the feminist and women’s rights
advocacy communities were split about whether the newly-enacted
Pregnancy Discrimination Act should walk the path of equal treatment,
requiring for pregnancy only the same level of treatment as other
conditions similarly affecting work, or take an accommodationist, noncomparative approach to pregnancy, recognizing its distinctive significance
for women’s work and reproductive lives. With the small exception of
permitting some non-comparative accommodations for pregnancy-related
disabilities, the PDA has hewed to the equal treatment model.2 And yet,
despite that model’s promise, the intervening three decades of litigation in
the lower courts have not been kind to the PDA, nor to pregnant women.
On December 3, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in Young v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., the most important pregnancy discrimination
case to reach the Court in a quarter century.3 The case raises crucial
questions about the meaning and scope of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (PDA) of 1978,4 a law passed to eradicate longstanding employer
policies that excluded pregnant women from the workforce, exempted them
from generally available leave and insurance benefits, or otherwise made it
difficult for them to maintain labor force attachments through the period of
pregnancy and childbirth. The Act emerged as a response to the Supreme
Court’s inability to recognize such policies as discriminatory; in a pair of
*Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful for the
assistance of Donae Minor (J.D. expected 2015, University of Pittsburgh School of Law), recipient of a
Derrick Bell Research Fellowship, for her work on this introduction and on the brief itself.
**Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law, Maurice A. Deane School of Law
at Hofstra University.
1
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 196 (1982).
2
See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
3
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013).
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
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cases in the 1970s, the Court held that pregnancy discrimination was not a
form of sex discrimination under either the Equal Protection Clause5 or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 The PDA was designed to
override the latter ruling.7
In addition to declaring pregnancy
discrimination a form of sex-based discrimination, the PDA includes a
second clause requiring employers to treat pregnant workers the same as
other workers with a “similar ability or inability to work.”8
In the cases that reached the Supreme Court after the enactment of the
PDA, the Court interpreted the statute broadly to give it the effect Congress
intended. In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., the
Court held that the guarantee of equal treatment applied to the pregnant
spouses of male employees who were covered by the employer’s health
insurance.9 In California Federal Savings v. Guerra, the Court held that
the second clause’s promise of identical treatment with comparable
workers was in fact a floor not a ceiling on the benefits for pregnant
workers; as a result, it did not preempt a state law’s more favorable
treatment of pregnancy-related disability.10 And finally, more recently, in
UAW v. Johnson Controls, the Court ruled that it was a violation of the
PDA for a battery manufacturing plant to exclude pregnant or fertile
women from jobs with high levels of lead exposure.11
In each of these cases, the Court was mindful of the PDA’s overarching
purpose—to facilitate women’s inclusion and advancement in the
workplace despite their distinctive role in the reproductive process. Yet, in
a series of cases beginning almost two decades ago, lower federal courts
have violated the spirit, and in some cases the direct language, of these
precedents when considering the validity of light-duty policies that grant
alternative assignments to some workers with temporary disability, but not
to pregnant workers with comparable restrictions. In Reeves v. Swift
Transportation Co., for example, the Sixth Circuit held valid a policy that
granted light duty to truck drivers who were injured on the job, but refused
it to all other workers with temporary disability.12 The plaintiff was a
5

See Gedulgig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974).
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
7
42 U.S.C. §2000e(k) (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.”).
8
Id. (“[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work[.]”).
9
See 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
10
See 479 U.S. 272, 292 (1987).
11
See 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991). In a more recent case, AT&T v. Hulteen, the Court took a hyper
technical view of the PDA in ruling that current female retirees could continue to be penalized in terms
of pension credits for maternity leaves they took before the PDA was enacted—and before the company
was forced to give the same credit to such leaves as it gave to other temporary disability leaves. 556
U.S. 701, 716 (2009).
12
446 F.3d 637, 638 (6th Cir. 2006).
6
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pregnant woman with a lifting restriction who was fired after being told
that the company had no light work for her to do.13 The court concluded
that the company’s light-duty policy was valid, however, because it was
“pregnancy blind” and not a pretext for discrimination.14 The Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits likewise upheld light-duty policies that drew similar
“pregnancy-blind” distinctions between workers eligible for such
assignments and those not eligible.15 The Seventh and Fourth Circuits
followed several years later with similar rulings.16
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling is the one currently pending in the Supreme
Court and for which the amicus curiae brief below was submitted. It raises
the same issue as previous cases, but on even more egregious facts and
with even more dire consequences given recent changes to the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as the brief explains.
Peggy Young was an “air driver” for United Parcel Service (UPS),
meaning she drove a route delivering packages that arrived by air rather
than ground and, for that reason, were typically lighter.17 When she
became pregnant, she was instructed by her doctor not to lift more than
twenty pounds.18 UPS’s policy allowed light-duty assignments to be
granted to three classes of drivers: (1) those injured on the job; (2) those
who have a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act; and
(3) those who are not eligible to work as a CDL driver for medical or other
reasons such as a suspended license.19 But UPS would not accommodate a
pregnant woman with a lifting restriction because she was not covered by
the company’s light-duty policy.20 The record in Young showed that UPS
had accommodated drivers for lifting restrictions that were even more
severe than Peggy Young’s and for injuries that were not incurred on the
job, but were sufficient to preclude CDL eligibility.21
Because women with pregnancy-related disability do not fall into any
of these categories,22 UPS permits them to “‘continue working as long as
they wanted to during their pregnancies, unless and until the employee
presented a doctor’s note or other medical certification that she had a
13

Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 642.
15
See Spivey v. Beverly Enters. Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
16
See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540 (7th Cir. 2011); Young v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013).
17
707 F.3d at 440.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 441.
20
Id.
21
Brief for Petitioner, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-2078),
2013 WL 93132, at *4-*9.
22
The ADA has been consistently interpreted to exclude normal pregnancy as a covered disability. See
Gorman v. Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting that “the majority of
federal courts hold that pregnancy-related complications do not constitute a disability under the ADA”).
14
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restriction that rendered her unable to perform the essential functions of the
job.’”23 If unable to work, pregnant drivers will be granted a leave of
absence.24 Young sought and received several short-term leaves of absence
as she went through three rounds of in vitro fertilization.25 When she
finally became pregnant during the third round, her doctor wrote a note
recommending that she lift no more than twenty pounds during the first
half of her pregnancy and no more “than 10 pounds thereafter.”26 After
some back-and-forth between Young and various supervisors at UPS about
whether the note imposed a “restriction” or only a “recommendation,” the
company decided that it could not allow her to continue working since she
was not capable of performing the lifting described in the list of essential
job functions for her position.27 Young had already used up all available
medical leave, so she was put on a leave of absence with no pay and no
medical coverage.28 She returned to work two months after giving birth in
2007.29
Young filed a lawsuit alleging sex and pregnancy discrimination, as
well as race and disability discrimination.30 The court rejected Young’s
argument that it facially discriminated against pregnant employees by
excluding pregnancy from eligibility for light-duty assignments.31 Because
the policy is “pregnancy-blind” and offers accommodations on the basis of
“gender-neutral criteria,” the court refused to treat the policy as facially
discriminatory or as raising an inference of pregnancy discrimination.32
The court then applied McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis and concluded
that Young did not establish that she met the fourth element – that a
“similarly situated employee” was treated differently.33 Young argued that
UPS accommodated a wide range of temporary physical disabilities from
high blood pressure and diabetes to drunk driving convictions.34 UPS
argued, and the appellate court agreed, that Young could not use anyone
who was eligible for ADA accommodation or had lost their legal ability to
drive as a comparator because they were not sufficiently similar in their
ability or inability to work. 35 There is no similarity, in the court’s view,
between a driver who suffers “from a legal obstacle to their operation of a
vehicle” and a woman whose pregnancy poses “a physical impairment that
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 08-2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *2 (D. Md. Fen. 14, 2011).
Id.
Id. at *3-*4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5-*6.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *11-*12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *12-*15.
Id. at *14-*15.
Id. at *12-*15.
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stymied her ability to lift.”36 The court also dismissed with little discussion
the notion that an ADA-eligible employee could be an appropriate
comparator for a Young.37 By eliminating a wide-range of employees to
serve as comparators, the court effectively made it impossible for Young to
prove that the second clause of the PDA was violated by UPS’s refusal of
her light-duty request.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling as
well as its reasoning.38 We argue in the brief that this reasoning effectively
undercuts the second clause of the PDA, rendering it a dead letter. In
explaining why the decision below is incompatible with the theory
underlying the PDA, we rely heavily on the vibrant new feminist legal
scholarship on pregnancy discrimination and the PDA. Part of our goal in
the brief is to connect the insights from this scholarship to the issues in this
case. By integrating this scholarship and applying it in a new way, the
brief itself contributes to the legal scholarship on the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, bridging the gap between theory and practice.39
The case is one of the most important gender discrimination cases to
reach the Court in many years. With women now comprising half the
workforce,40 and most women becoming pregnant during their working
lives, the likelihood that a woman will face a conflict at some point
between work and pregnancy is very high. The majority of women work
during pregnancy and return to the workforce following their pregnancy.41
“For example, two-thirds of women who had their first child between 2006
and 2008 worked during [their] pregnancy, and [eighty-eight] percent of
these first-time mothers worked into their last trimester.”42 For many
women, the short-term physical effects of pregnancy will at some point
conflict with the demands of their job.43
The nature of the conflict varies by the particular job and the
progression of the pregnancy, but such conflicts often include lifting and
36

Id. at *13.
Id. at *19-*20.
Young, 707 F.3d at 439.
39
Cf. Emily M.S. Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905 (2006).
40
See U.S. CONGRESS JOINT ECON. COMM., WOMEN AND THE ECONOMY 2010: 25 YEARS OF
PROGRESS BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN 1 (2010), available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=8be22cb0-8ed0-4a1a-841b-aa91dc55fa81;
see also Full Transcript: Obama’s 2014 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-obamas-2014-state-of-the-unionaddress/2014/01/28/e0c93358-887f-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html.
41
NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE PREGNANT WORKERS FAIRNESS ACT: MAKING ROOM FOR
PREGNANCY ON THE JOB 2 (2013), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnantworkersfairnessfactsheet_w_bill_number.pdf
[hereinafter MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY].
42
Id.
43
Joanna L. Grossman, The Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act: Accommodating the Needs of
Pregnant Working Women, VERDICT (May 11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/11/thepregnant-workers-fairness-act.
37
38
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standing restrictions, the need for more frequent breaks, and scheduling
adjustments for medical appointments and sick leave.44 Much of the time,
such conflicts can be resolved with minor accommodations, which are
often cost-efficient and simple to administer.45 Nevertheless, employers
too often have blatantly refused to provide accommodations to pregnant
women, even while doing so for other workers.46 Such refusals play a
significant part in the conflicts that track women into less desirable jobs or
force them out of the workforce entirely, with lasting personal, health and
financial consequences.47 Last year, the EEOC received over five thousand
charges of pregnancy discrimination, making it one of the fastest-growing
types of claims.48
The work-pregnancy conflicts at stake in these cases overwhelmingly
harm low-income workers and women in non-traditional, male-dominated
jobs.49 First, these workers are most likely to experience lasting,
devastating economic harm when these conflicts result in job loss. Fortyone percent of women are the primary breadwinners for their families, and
their ability to work while pregnant is critical to their family’s economic
survival.50 Moreover, the types of jobs that are especially likely to require
accommodation for pregnancy are those that typically pay less, such as
retail clerk and shelf stocker, or require physically rigorous tasks
traditionally reserved for men, such as firefighter and police officer.51
Representative examples include a pregnant food-server and restaurant
line-worker who needed more bathroom breaks, a pregnant hotel cleaner
with a twenty pound lifting restriction, and a pregnant security officer who
needed a stool for sitting in a job that required long hours of standing.52
When employers deny such simple accommodations, workers are
terminated or forced to take unpaid leave, with devastating consequences.53
44

See id.
See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING PREGNANT
WORKERS (2012), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant_workers_business_case_12.04.12.pdf.
46
See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., IT SHOULDN’T BE A HEAVY LIFT: FAIR TREATMENT FOR
PREGNANT WORKERS 5, 7 (2013), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pregnant_workers.pdf.
47
Id.
48
See Claire Zillman, Yes, pregnancy discrimination at work is still a huge problem (July 15, 2014,
5:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/07/15/pregnancy-discrimination/.
49
Id.; see also MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY, supra note 41, at 5.
50
MAKING ROOM FOR PREGNANCY, supra note 41, at 3 (stating that forty-one percent of working
mothers were their family’s primary breadwinner in 2010).
51
Id. at 5-7.
52
Id.
53
See A BETTER BALANCE: THE WORK & FAMILY LEGAL CENTER ET AL., THE REFUSAL TO
ACCOMMODATE PREGNANT WORKERS: REAL ACCOUNTS OF THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES FOR
WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2013), available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/true_stories_about_why_pregnant_workers_need_workplace_accomm
odations.pdf.
45
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Pregnant women who are not provided with needed accommodations have
to struggle to support their families, often relying on governmental
assistance to replace lost wages.54 They may also suffer from pregnancyrelated and health complications, particularly if, as many women do, they
continue to work and refrain from asking about accommodations for fear of
losing their jobs.55
A loss in Young would give employers the green light to refuse even
eminently reasonable accommodations for pregnant women. In that event,
PDA scholarship and advocacy should explore the need for alternative
legislative solutions, such as the Pregnancy Workers Fairness Act.
(PWFA)56 The PWFA is a proposed bill that was introduced to the House
of Representatives on May 8th, 2012.57 The purpose of the bill is to
eliminate discrimination and promote women’s health and economic
security by ensuring reasonable workplace accommodations for workers
whose ability to perform the functions of a job are limited by pregnancy,
childbirth, or a related medical condition.58 Modeled after the ADA, the
PWFA would require employers to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnancy, child birth, and related conditions and bar employers from
denying employment opportunities based on the need for accommodations.
Under the bill, an employee could not be forced accept an accommodation
if she preferred to continue in her existing job, nor could it force her to take
a leave from work if a known reasonable alternative is available.59 The
PWFA’s express goal is to raise the floor of treatment of pregnancy in the
workplace so that “[n]o. . .woman [will] have to choose between her job
and a healthy pregnancy.”60
A loss in Young would leave pregnancy stuck in a growing gap between
the PDA and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), despite the
compatible and mutually reinforcing purposes of the two Acts.61 Even
though the American with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) of
2008 broadened the universe of disabilities that require accommodations to
include temporary impairments and less severe impairments, normal
54

See id.
See id. at 3.
56
See Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 5647, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Senators Casey and Shaheen, Reps Nadler, Maloney, Speier, Davis and Fudge Introduce
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act to Protect Pregnant Women from Workplace Discrimination, ROBERT
P. CASEY, JR. (May 14, 2013), http://www.casey.senate.gov/newsroom/releases/senators-casey-andshaheen-reps-nadler-maloney-speier-davis-and-fudge-introduce-pregnant-workers-fairness-act-toprotect-pregnant-women-from-workplace-discrimination (quoting Dina Bakst, President of A Better
Balance).
61
See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT AND THE AMENDED
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: WORKING TOGETHER TO PROTECT WORKERS (2013), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/pda_adaaa_preg_workers_fact_sheet.pdf.
55
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pregnancy is still not considered to be an impairment under the ADA.62
And yet, since many of the temporary disabilities now protected under the
ADAAA have similar work-related effects as pregnancy, they should raise
bar for accommodating pregnant workers as well.63
Without a
reinvigorated PDA through a victory for the petitioner in Young, the PWFA
will be needed to close this gap.
Against this backdrop of the current state of weak federal legal
protections for pregnant workers, several states and cities have recently
passed state and local laws to expand protections for pregnant workers.64
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Texas, and West Virginia
are among the states that have enacted laws specifically covering the work
conflicts faced by pregnant workers.65 These state protections require
employers to provide reasonable accommodations for pregnant workers.66
For example, West Virginia recently passed its Pregnancy Workers
Fairness Act, using the same title and substantive language as the proposed
federal legislation.67 In addition to these states, several municipalities have
enacted city ordinances to protect pregnant workers.68 The cities of New
York, New York; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Central Falls, Rhode Island;
Providence, Rhode Island; and most recently Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania have
all enacted city ordinances addressing work-pregnancy conflicts.69 Similar
to state laws, these city ordinances require employers to reasonably
accommodate conditions related to pregnancy.70
While these state and local laws reflect a growing public commitment
to ease the conflicts of work and pregnancy, they are not a substitute for
federal-level protection. For example, the city ordinances are limited in
scope and application.71 For instance, the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
ordinance applies only to those businesses with city contracts worth
$250,000 or more; contractors bidding on city jobs must certify that they

62

See id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2-3.
64
State and Local Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, A BETTER BALANCE,
http://www.abetterbalance.org/web/ourissues/fairness-for-pregnant-workers/310 (last visited Jan. 19,
2015).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
See W. VA. CODE R. §§ 5-11B-1-B-2 (2014).
68
State and Local Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, supra note 64.
69
Id.; see also PITTSBURGH, PA., ORDINANCES ch. 161, art. VII, § 161.44 (2014), available at
https://pittsburgh.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1911405&GUID=31C757AF-40A9-4C448E7C-7EA971776160&Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=pregnant.
70
Id.; State and Local Laws Protecting Pregnant Workers, supra note 64.
71
See Robert Zullo, Pittsburgh City Council advances panhandling restrictions, pregnancy
protections (Oct. 2, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/2014/10/02/Counciladvances-panhandling-restrictions-pregnancy-protections/stories/201410020233.
63
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will comply with the ordinance and notify their employees.72 Although, the
Pittsburgh city ordinance will still provide protection for approximately
800 or more city employees and an undetermined number of contractors, it
leaves many employees in the city without such protection.73 State laws
and other city ordinances have similar gaps, and together create only a thin
patchwork of remedies for pregnant workers.
While it is commendable that states and municipalities have taken
affirmative steps to address the current gap in federal law on a local level,
such local laws fall far short of an adequate solution. As the Young case
illustrates, until this gap is closed at the federal level, pregnant workers will
continue to fall through the breach.

72
See id; see also Pittsburgh Approves Workplace Protections for Pregnant City Employees, NAT’L
P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES (Oct. 17, 2014),
http://go.nationalpartnership.org/site/News2?abbr=daily2_&page=NewsArticle&id=45843.
73
Pittsburgh Approves Workplace Protections for Pregnant City Employees, supra note 72.
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Amici curiae are law professors, women’s rights
organizations, and civil rights organizations that share
expertise in pregnancy discrimination and a longstanding
commitment to civil rights and equality in the workplace for all
Americans. Their interest in this case is in ensuring that the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act is given its intended meaning.
Statements of interest for the organizations and a list of
individual signatories may be found in Appendix A.
—————————————————————————————————
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case presents an issue of great significance for working
women in the United States. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling
interprets the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e(k) (2012) (“PDA”), in a manner that is inconsistent
with the statutory text, Congress’ intent, and this Court’s
post-PDA precedents. The ruling reverts to a pre-PDA
approach, placing pregnancy in a class by itself and excluding
pregnant women from workplace benefits and accommodations
available to others who are similar in their ability or inability
to work. The ruling undermines the very purpose of the PDA,
which was to help pregnant women maintain labor-force
attachments and have greater economic stability.
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling reinvigorates the reasoning in
General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which the PDA
was specifically passed to supersede. It marks a return to the
philosophy that employers can provide less support for
pregnancy than they do for other health conditions that affect
work, so long as their decision to deny coverage is not motivated
by animus. But the PDA repudiates this approach. In its
Second Clause, the Act defines what equal treatment means:
employers must treat pregnant workers “the same . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). In other words, the
PDA creates a comparative right of accommodation with a
____________________________________________________
1

Pursuant to Rule 37.6, counsel for amici states that no counsel for a party

authored this brief in whole or in part, and that no person other than amici, their
members, or their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or
submission of this brief. Counsel for petitioner and respondent have consented to its
filing in letters on file with the Court.

baseline that turns on the work effects of an employee’s
incapacity, rather than its source. This mandate solves the
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analogy problem that plagued pre-PDA courts and led
employers to simply exempt pregnancy, a health condition that
affects only women, from otherwise available benefits. This
Court has consistently instructed that the Second Clause means
what it says – that pregnant workers cannot be treated worse
than workers with similar limitations.
By refusing to allow Peggy Young to compare herself to
workers injured on the job, workers whose accommodations
were required by a collective bargaining agreement, or workers
entitled to accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 (“ADA”), the Fourth Circuit has stripped
pregnant women of most potential comparators. This renders
the comparative right of accommodation around which the
PDA is built essentially meaning- less. This problem will only
escalate with the recent amendments to the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§12102, which expand the pool of employees entitled to
reasonable accommodation to include those with temporary
conditions analogous to pregnancy. Under this reading,
Congress’ expansion of protections for employees with other
disabilities would have the perverse effect of decreasing the
level of support for pregnancy. The Fourth Circuit’s approach,
if left standing, will exponentially widen the gulf in employment
opportunities between pregnant women and others “similar in
their ability or inability to work.” See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
Nothing in the text of the ADA or its amendments supports
this reading, nor is there any precedent for allowing one
statute to nullify another without ex- press Congressional
direction to do so.
The Fourth Circuit’s central mistake is to collapse the PDA’s
first and second clauses into a singular search for animus.
Instead of simply asking whether Peggy Young was treated
worse than other employees similar in their ability or inability to
work, as clearly mandated by the statutory text, the Fourth Circuit
mistakenly applied the pretext model of proof in a search for
an invidious motive. But a formal policy that ignores the
PDA’s directive to treat two groups the same is unlawful
disparate treatment, regardless of the motive underlying the
policy. This approach ignores the PDA’s clear command to
focus on the effects of pregnancy rather than its unique nature
in order to ensure equal opportunity for women and mothers.
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling exacerbates harmful stereotypes
about pregnant workers, one of the primary problems the
PDA was intended to counteract. The lower court’s reasoning
and approach traffic in the notion that pregnancy is a unique
liability undeserving of accommodation and reinforce a gender
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ideology that is incompatible with women’s full participation
in the labor force.
Moreover, the women most in need of the PDA’s protection
are most harmed by the ruling below. The persistence of
pregnancy discrimination in the work- place is well documented,
but it is women in low-wage jobs or traditionally male-dominated
occupations who are most likely to experience temporary
conflicts between the physical effects of pregnancy and job
requirements. Studies and caselaw reveal a reluctance by some
employers to provide even minor and costless accommodations,
reflecting hostility to pregnant women in the workplace.
Pregnancy discrimination excludes women from traditionally
‘male’ jobs and renders low-wage, sex-segregated jobs less secure.
The Fourth Circuit’s misunderstanding of the PDA’s Second
Clause will create profound economic instability for such women
and their families, leading to well- known obstacles to re-entry if
they lose their jobs.
In sum, the Fourth Circuit’s ruling adopts a view of
pregnancy discrimination that belies both the text and intent of
the PDA, reinforces stereotypes about the incompatibility of
pregnancy with paid employment, and undermines this Court’s
longstanding commitment to the “equal opportunity to aspire,
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on . . .
individual talents and capacities.” United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
For these reasons, we urge the Court to reverse the Fourth
Circuit’s ruling and restore the intended scope of the PDA.
—————————————————————————————————
ARGUMENT
I. THE DECISION BELOW IGNORES THE HISTORY
OF THE PDA AND REVIVES THE VERY DECISIONS
CONGRESS SOUGHT TO SUPERSEDE
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling belies the history that led to the
PDA’s enactment. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494
(1974), this Court refused to recognize that the exclusion of
pregnancy, a condition only affecting women, from an
otherwise near- comprehensive disability plan discriminates on
the basis of sex. Although criticism of Geduldig would soon
become a “cottage industry,” Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 983 (1984), and the
opinion would later become one with a “widely criticized
conclusion” that members of this Court are “perhaps
embarrassed” to cite, Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals, 132 S. Ct. 1327,
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1347 n.6 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), its circle of
damage was nonetheless expanded two years later. In General
Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976), this Court applied
the same formalistic reasoning to hold that pregnancy
discrimination was not a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et
seq. (2012). The Court thus upheld a private employer’s
policy that denied disability benefits during pregnancy leave
while granting them for other types of temporary leave. Briefs
in Geduldig had urged this Court to consider the potential
impact on Title VII, see Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at
Work: Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex Discrimination
Law, 91 Wash. U.L. Rev. 453, 485, 491-92 (2014), for fear of this
exact result.
Congress enacted the PDA for the express purpose of
repudiating this Court’s holding in Gilbert and the Geduldig
reasoning that drove it. Congress did not hide its disdain for
Gilbert and its intent to over- ride it. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 (1987) (observing that the
PDA unambiguously rejected Gilbert); Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983) (same).
The PDA contains two distinct clauses. The First Clause rejects
Gilbert by adding a new provision to the definitions section of
Title VII, pro- viding that the “terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the
basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 42
U.S.C. §2000e(k). Notably, the two quoted phrases in the statute
appear, in this precise form, nowhere else in the statute. They
do appear, however, in the Gilbert decision. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at
135, 145 (holding that the exclusion of pregnancy does not
discriminate “on the basis of sex” and is compatible with
Congress’ command to prohibit discrimination “ ‘because of . . .
sex’ “). This particular drafting of the statute makes sense only
as a direct response to Gilbert. The Second Clause directs how
employers must treat pregnant workers: “the same . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k).
In enacting the PDA, Congress recognized that employer
responses to pregnancy have played a central role in workplace
discrimination against women. As Justice Ginsburg has
observed, “[c]ertain attitudes about pregnancy and childbirth,
throughout human history, have sustained pervasive, often lawsanctioned, restrictions on a woman’s place among paid
workers and active citizens.” AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S.
701, 724 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Cleveland Bd.
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of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634-35 (1974) (striking
down school board rule forcing pregnant teachers to take
unpaid leave after the fourth month of pregnancy); Joanna L.
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal
Citizenship, 98 Georgetown L.J. 567, 595-600 (2010)
(discussing exclusionary policies and practices). Congress
responded to this history with specific directives to eliminate a
wide-range of employment policies that openly discriminated
against pregnant workers or based employment decisions on
stereo- typed assumptions about their capacity to work. The
PDA was designed to make the workplace as amenable to
pregnancy as it was to other conditions affecting work –
something employers had been reluctant to do on their own,
even when unions pushed for such treatment in the collective
bargaining process. See Dinner, Strange Bedfellows, supra, at 47274.
The PDA was a swift rejection of the Court’s earlier
philosophy on pregnancy: that ignoring the status of pregnancy
fully met an employer’s obligation to pregnant workers.
Instead, the Act was de- signed to “enable women to maintain
labor-force attachments throughout pregnancy and childbirth.”
Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
415, 484 (2011). Thus, the decision below, which equates
pregnancy-blindness with PDA compliance ignores – even
defies
–
that
history. See Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow
Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 511, 551-56 (2009). By characterizing UPS’s light-duty
policy as “pregnancy-blind,” the Fourth Circuit is engaging in
the same kind of formalistic reasoning as the Court did in
Geduldig and Gilbert. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the
“Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination, 125 Harv. L. Rev.
1307, 1358-59 (2012) (noting that “Gilbert relied on the same
nar- row, anticlassificationist reasoning . . . [seeing discrimination as applicable] . . . only to practices that sort men
and women into two groups perfectly differentiated on the basis
of biological sex.”). The policies in Gilbert and Geduldig could
easily have been deemed “pregnancy blind” under the Fourth
Circuit’s standard if reworded only slightly to specify a nearexhaustive list of covered conditions while omitting pregnancy.
Allowing this ruling to stand would breathe life into precedent
specifically overridden by Congress.
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II. THE DECISION BELOW MISCONSTRUES AND
MISAPPLIES THE SECOND CLAUSE OF THE PDA
A. The Second Clause of the PDA Creates and Defines a
Right to Equal Treatment.
The decision below fails to give any effect to the Second
Clause of the PDA, which provides that “women affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
inability to work. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). To remedy a longstanding problem of employer policies that treated pregnancy as
sui generis and denied pregnant women otherwise generally
available benefits, Congress created a comparison group for
pregnant women – employees “similar in their ability or
inability to work” – and directed that the two groups be treated
“the same for all employment-related purposes.” Id.; see also
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 678 n.14 (1983) (“The meaning of the first clause is not
limited by the specific language in the second clause, which
explains the application of the general principle to women
employees.”).
The Second Clause, by design, solves the analogy problem –
the idea that pregnancy could be treated worse simply because
it was not identical to any other work-limiting condition – that
lay behind Geduldig and Gilbert. It establishes a baseline – a
“floor . . . not a ceiling,” Guerra, 479 U.S. at 285 – that
entitles pregnant workers to identify instances of unequal
treatment and demand parity. Moreover, as this Court made clear
in Guerra, under the PDA, a comparator may be selected only
on the basis of ability or inability to work: the employer’s
motivation for accommodating the needs of the comparator is
irrelevant. This remains true when the employer is compelled to
treat a comparator in a certain manner in order to comply with
some other law. See Section III infra. As the House Report
on the PDA explains, the Second Clause provides the only
appropriate point of comparison for pregnant workers with
comparable limitations: “their actual ability to perform work.”
H.R. Rep. 95-948, at 5 (1978); see also Amending Title VII, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 4 (1977) (“Under
this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered
employment must focus not on their condition alone but on the
actual effects of that condition on h a their ability to work.
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Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to
work on the same conditions as other employees.”).
This interpretation does not convert the comparative right of
accommodation into an absolute one, requiring “special
treatment” for pregnant workers who require accommodation.
Quite the contrary. Accommodating workers with comparable
limitations but not pregnant workers disadvantages pregnant
women. As the new guidance issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) makes clear,
employers can limit the number or duration of light-duty
assignments, or even refuse to offer them altogether, as long as
limits or restrictions apply to pregnant and non-pregnant workers
with similar levels of incapacity alike. See U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Enforcement
Guidance on Pregnancy and Related Issues, No. 915.001, July
14, 2014, at 11 (hereinafter “EEOC Guidance”). But what they
cannot do is offer benefits to some similarly restricted workers
while withholding them from pregnant workers.
Peggy Young’s complaint simply asks that the Second Clause
of the PDA be given the effect its text mandates. The Second
Clause denotes an additional and distinctive obligation with
independent meaning. The statute’s structure makes this
apparent. The Second Clause is set off by a semi-colon and the
word “and,” and it includes a verb – “shall” – that clearly
imposes a discrete obligation on employers: employers “shall”
treat pregnant workers the “same” as other workers with
similar work limitations.2
Moreover, the Second Clause does not invite employers to
treat pregnancy only as well as other least favored workers.
Even the policies at issue in Geduldig and Gilbert, which
Congress clearly rejected under Title VII, excluded some other
conditions – dispsomania and sexual psychopathy, for example
– along with pregnancy.
__________________________________________________
2 That the PDA appears in the definitional section of Title VII is of no matter.
The mandate for religious accommodations appears there as well, but has been given full
substantive effect.
(Continued on following page)
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The PDA directive is simple. If an employer provides
support for other health conditions that interfere with work, it
must provide the same level of support for pregnancy. Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit conceded that “[s]tanding alone, the second
clause’s plain language is unambiguous.” The lower court
nevertheless declined to apply its clear import by alleging that its
juxtaposition with the first clause creates “confusion” and
“potential incongruence.” Pet App. 20a-21a. It then resolved its
straw-man conflict by taking the draconian step of rendering the
Second Clause meaningless, in direct contravention of this
Court’s warning not to “read the second clause out of the Act,”
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,
205 (1991). The ruling below asserts that the Second Clause
“does not create a distinct and independent cause of action,”
not because the text does not support that reading, but because
such a reading would create “anomalous consequences” such as
treating pregnancy “more favorably than any other basis” under
Title VII. Pet. App. 20a-21a. But this is clearly incorrect.
Providing an accommodation to a pregnant employee when an
employer has made the same accommodation available to employees with other health conditions is not “more favorable”
treatment – it is simply equal treatment, as mandated by the
PDA. As this Court explained in Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at
204, “The PDA’s amendment to Title VII contains a BFOQ
standard of its own: Unless pregnant employees differ from
others ‘in their ability or inability to work,’ they must be ‘treated
the same’ as other employees ‘for all employment-related
purposes.’ “ (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e(k)). Eschewing this
Court’s holding that “the PDA means what it says,” id. at 211,
the court below departed from the text and its intended
meaning to circumscribe protection for pregnant workers.
____________________________________________________
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) (2012); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 281
& n.12 (3d Cir. 2001). Moreover, the text of the Second Clause cannot be “ ‘substituted’ in
for sex” in the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII without resulting in
“grammatically incoherent directives.” Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 961, 1012-13 (2013).
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B. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach Turns the Second Clause
Into a Search for Animus and Misapprehends the Theory
Behind the PDA.
The court below neglected the teachings of this Court’s
PDA decisions and misunderstood both the theory behind
PDA and the approach to pregnancy discrimination it
embraces. This Court has long been clear that treating
pregnancy differently than other conditions with a similar
effect on work violates the statute regardless of the employer’s
motivation. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 (“Whether
an employment practice involves disparate treatment through
explicit facial discrimination does not depend on why the
employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the
discrimination.”); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (“The 1978
Act makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancyrelated conditions less
favorably
than
other
medical
conditions.”). In- stead of simply applying the Second Clause,
the court below embarked on an unnecessary and ill-conceived
search for anti-pregnancy animus. Pet. App. 17a-18a (faulting
plaintiff ‘s lack of “evidence of UPS’s discriminatory animus
toward pregnant workers”); Pet. App. 28a (stating that the
“facts fail to demonstrate the specific animus Young ascribes
to them”); Pet. App. 17a-19a (rejecting plaintiff ‘s evidence for
failing to show “general corporate animus against pregnant
employees”). Finding none, the court pronounced the UPS
policy “pregnancy-blind.” Pet. App. 18a. The Fourth Circuit is
not alone on this misguided path. See Serednyj v. Beverly
Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548-49 (7th Cir. 2011); Reeves
v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2006). This
Court must remind lower courts that no additional proof of
intent is required if a plaintiff proves that her employer
treated pregnancy worse than other conditions with a similar
effect on work.
The Fourth Circuit’s insistence on proof of an antipregnancy bias behind the UPS policy parallels the reasoning
of the short-lived Gilbert decision. Like the court below, the
Gilbert Court faulted the plaintiff for failing to prove that the
employer’s policy of omitting coverage for pregnancy was a
pretext for intentional discrimination. See Gilbert, 429 U.S.
at 135-36. Instead of finding “invidious” discrimination, the
Court found the employer’s temporary disability policy was
predicated upon a neutral, cost-driven calculus. Id. at 130-32,
136; see also Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494 (explaining the state’s
different treatment of pregnancy as “a policy determination”
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reflecting cost-based judgments rather than “invidious discrimination”).
Taking the same wrong turn, the court below assumed that a
neutrally-framed explanation for treating pregnancy worse than
other conditions renders it non-discriminatory. But purportedly
neutral explanations, such as cost, have always been available
to explain the sui generis treatment of pregnancy, even as they
masked implicit assumptions about women’s worth as
employees and the effect of pregnancy on worker productivity.
See Dinner, Strange Bedfellows, supra, at 476-79 (explaining
that cost estimates contained biases about the expected return
on employer investments in workers and assumptions about
conflicts between work and pregnancy); id. at 475-76 (tracking
the substitution of cost-based rationales for overt gender
stereotyping, once the latter became politically unpalatable).
The PDA responded to that history by ensuring that any costbenefit analysis would be conducted “without the overlay of still
prevalent stereotypes and bias about the capacity of pregnant
employees or the likelihood that pregnant employees return to
work after childbirth.” Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The
Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
961, 1028 (2013). Yet light-duty exclusions also implicitly rely
on stereotype-driven assessments of cost to justify including
the favored conditions while omit- ting pregnancy. Id. at 1032.
As Congress well understood in enacting the PDA,
stereotypes about pregnancy have long shaped employer
responses to pregnant workers and work- place policies
governing pregnancy, and they continue to do so today. Social
science research documents the persistence of gender stereotypes
triggered by an employee’s pregnancy. See Deborah L. Brake &
Joanna L. Grossman, Unprotected Sex: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act at 35, 68 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 67, 103107 (2013) (discussing social science research on pregnancy and
maternity bias in the workplace). Some of these stereotypes are
descriptive, ascribing to pregnant workers a lower level of
competence and a reduced commitment to the workplace. See
Grossman, supra, at 577 (collecting and describing studies);
Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Mother- hood
Penalty, 59 Hastings L.J. 1359, 1369-72 (2008) (same). Others
are prescriptive, prioritizing women’s maternal functions and
devaluing women’s roles as workers. See Joan C. Williams et
al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the
ADA Amendments Act, 32 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 97, 103-104
(2013) (citing studies). The PDA responds to both sets of
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stereotypes by ensuring that pregnant women have the same
rights to work, and under the same conditions, as other
employees with conditions similarly affecting work capacity.
In failing to grasp the discriminatory treatment in UPS’s
policy, the court below misunderstood the theory at the heart of
the PDA. Both proponents and opponents of the Act understood
that contested assumptions about pregnant workers were at the
heart of the fight over the baseline by which to set the
nondiscriminatory treatment of pregnancy. The Act’s detractors
grounded their arguments in traditional views about women,
especially mothers, as “ ‘margin- al participants in labor markets.’
“ Franklin, supra, at 1321; see also id. at 1336 n.140 (citing
arguments employers made to the EEOC in 1965, urging a narrow definition of sex discrimination because women leave the
workforce when they marry and employer investments in worker
training are lost). PDA proponents made their case for the
legislation by high- lighting the significance of gender stereotypes
about pregnancy to women’s equal rights at work. See Nicholas
Pedriana, Discrimination by Definition: The Historical and Legal
Paths to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 21 Yale J.L.
& Feminism 1, 12 (2009) (citing testimony and views of PDA
proponents). As Wendy Williams, a key proponent of the PDA,
explained the backdrop to the legislation:
Pervasively, pregnancy was treated less favorably
than other
physical
conditions
that affected
workplace performance. The pattern of rules
telegraphed
the
underlying
assumption:
a
woman’s pregnancy signaled her dis- engagement
from the workplace. Implicit was not only a factual
but a normative judgment: when wage-earning
women became pregnant they did, and should, go
home.
Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 325, 335 (1984-85).
Employers’ differential treatment of pregnancy was a key
part of the systemic stereotyping to which the PDA responded:
the refusal to treat pregnant women as “real” workers. See
Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water, supra, at 103 (“women who
seek accommodations for a condition arising out of pregnancy
frequently meet with hostility fueled by gender stereotyping”).
The Second Clause is a corrective to a particular form of
pregnancy discrimination that took shape historically – and, as
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this case makes clear, persists. As employers developed more
generous benefit plans in order to attract skilled labor in
response to a tightening labor market, they exempted pregnant
workers from these benefits, seeing them as poor investments,
more likely to leave the workplace and be supported by a male
breadwinner. See Dinner, Strange Bedfellows, supra, at 496-97
& n.188 (citing PDA opponents’ arguments that pregnant
women leave the workplace); id. at 498 (noting opponent’s
argument that disability benefits should be reserved for family
providers and “women are not breadwinners”). This same
gender ideology underlay the state’s argument in Geduldig,
defending its omission of pregnancy on the ground that women
return to work after pregnancy at lower levels than workers
recovering from other conditions. See Oral Argument at 15:17,
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (No. 73-640), available
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1970-1979/1973/1973_73_640 (“ . . .
there is a major difference in the return to work rate following
disability from pregnancy”); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Gender and the Constitution, 44 Cinc. L. Rev. 1, 42 (1975)
(articulating the Court’s implicit rationale in Geduldig that
“pregnancy- related disability has no place in a worker’s
benefit program” because “childbirth marks a new period in
the woman’s life cycle” in which “she should be supported by
the family’s man, not the state or an employer she is destined
to leave”).
The same set of gender stereotypes that forced pregnant
women out of some jobs altogether (as in the school teacher
cases) also prompted employers to adopt workplace policies that
treated pregnancy worse than other conditions affecting work
capacity. See Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby:
Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in
Hibbs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1871, 1894 (2006) (“Failure to treat
pregnant employees ‘the same as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work’ reflects the
unconstitutional sex-role stereotype that, as Hibbs put it, ‘women’s family duties trump those of the workplace.’ “). These
distinct forms of pregnancy discrimination are interrelated and
reinforcing. The unfavorable treatment of pregnancy in
workplace policies on benefits and accommodations is an
effective way to push pregnant women out of their jobs. See
Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of
the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86 Colum. L. Rev.
1118, 1123-24 (1986). Both types of discrimination – the
outright termination of pregnant employees and workplace
policies disfavoring pregnancy from other conditions – are

DO NOT DELETE

No. 1]

5/19/15 10:55 AM

Introduction Amici Curiae Brief in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

93

predicated on the same stereo- typical view of women as
mothers first, workers second. See Coleman v. Ct. of Appeals,
132 S. Ct. 1327, 1343 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
witness in PDA hearings articulating the gender ideology behind
pregnancy discrimination, that “women are mothers first, and
workers second”); id. at 1345 (dis- cussing the gender
stereotypes about women’s commitment to the workforce that
underlie pregnancy discrimination).
These stereotypes continue to have traction through the
policies of employers, like UPS, that re- fuse light-duty
accommodations for pregnancy, de- spite granting them to
workers with other conditions similarly affecting work. Cf.
Finley, supra, at 1136 (discussing the stereotypes underlying
employer refusals to fold pregnancy into workplace policies on
the same terms as other conditions, including: that pregnancy is
a voluntary, natural choice for women; that employers should
not have to bear the costs of covering it; and that doing so
would be unfair to the “real” workers deserving of such benefits).
Despite these core lessons of the PDA, the court below
stubbornly and repeatedly referred to the PDA’s directive in
the Second Clause as requiring “preferential” treatment for
pregnancy or, even more derisively, “most favored nation”
status. Pet. App. 19a-23a; see also Reeves, 446 F.3d at 642
(rejecting plaintiff ‘s challenge to discriminatory light-duty policy
as asking for “preferential treatment”); Urbano v. Continental
Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); Spivey v.
Beverly Enters., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). This
disparaging
terminology
itself
bespeaks
a
grave
misunderstanding of the PDA and reinstates the very stereotypes
about work and pregnancy that the Act was designed to
eradicate. See Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water, supra, at
103-104 (tracing courts’ “intuition that pregnant women are
asking for ‘special treatment’ “ to gender-stereotyped views
linking the costs of accommodating male workers to the
“ordinary costs of doing business,” but costs associated with
pregnancy as “something extra that employers should not have
to shoulder”). Indeed, the Gilbert Court used this exact same
baseline, classifying the excision of pregnancy from the
employer’s benefit plan as neutral – and by extension,rendering
any inclusion of pregnancy alongside the favored conditions
to be special treatment. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 134-35.
Congress rebuked this very reasoning when it enacted the
PDA. The Act responded to the flawed view that pregnancy is
“unique” by isolating the effects of pregnancy on one’s capacity
to work as the proper point for comparison. Cf. Katharine T.
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Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap,
62 Cal. L. Rev. 1532, 1536 (1974) (“ . . . pregnancy’s unique
identifiability facilitates drafting laws and regulations based on
exactly those generalizations, stereotypes, and assumptions that
constitutional doctrine in the area of sex discrimination was
intended to curb.”). By honing in on the work effects of
pregnancy, the PDA drives home the key lesson that, in its
effects on work, pregnancy is not unique after all, but one part
of a broad complex of human conditions that affect work
capacity. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some
Reflections on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7 Women’s
Rts. L. Rep. 175, 193 (1982). The Second Clause instructs
that treating pregnancy as well as other conditions with a
similar effect on work is not special treatment, but rather the
very definition of what it means not to discriminate on the basis
of pregnancy.
The decision below and others like it veer so far off course
in part because they insist on shoehorning all PDA claims into
the McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
pretext proof framework, which was designed to smoke out
discriminatory intent from circumstantial evidence. Pet. App. 25a29a; see also Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra, at 1018-26 (discussing
and critiquing lower courts’ use of this framework in rejecting
PDA challenges to discriminatory accommodation policies).
While the pretext model is applicable to pregnancy discrimination
cases if the contested issue is whether the plaintiff ‘s pregnancy
was the reason for the adverse action taken against her, it is
not necessary in cases like this one, where the employer
admits to treating pregnancy worse than other conditions with a
similar effect on work. See Williams, Equality’s Riddle, supra, at
349 (“With Newport News, Gilbert’s conceptual framework is
definitively interred. Pregnancy-based rules prima facie violate
Title VII. . . . The more complicated inquiries [of pretext] . . .
are now irrelevant.”); cf. id. at 349 n.101 (noting the
continuing viability of the pretext model where the adverse
action is not taken pursuant to an employer policy, but
allegedly based on a covert intent to discriminate because of
pregnancy); Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making
Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the PDA’s Capacity-Based
Model, 21 Yale J.L. & Feminism 15, 36 (2009) (arguing that
exclusionary light- duty policies constitute per se disparate
treatment). In the case below, there was no need to “smoke out”
the employer’s intent behind its differential treatment of
pregnancy. Proof that the employer grants light-duty work for
other conditions with a similar effect on work, but not for
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pregnancy, establishes the violation. See EEOC Guidance, supra,
at 12 (“A plaintiff need not resort to the burden shifting analysis set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green in order to
establish a violation of the PDA where there is . . . evidence
that a pregnant employee was denied a light-duty position
provided to other employees who are similar to the pregnant
employee in their ability to work.”).
Even though the McDonnell-Douglas model and its prima
facie case might be sufficiently modified to fit the fact patterns
in the refusal-to-accommodate cases, there is no reason to do
so. Filtering the evidence through the prima facie case,
followed by the employer’s proffer of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the differential treatment of pregnancy,
and culminating in an inquiry into whether the proffered reason
is a pretext for discrimination, is unnecessarily formalistic and
encourages courts to focus on the wrong issue: the employer’s
3
subjective mindset in treating pregnancy differently.
The text of the Second Clause leaves no room for a
distinction based on the source of the condition to masquerade
as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. See Amending Title
VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, S. Rep. No. 95-331, at 4 (1977) (“the
treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus
not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that
condition on their ability to work”); EEOC Guidance, supra, at
7 (“An employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant worker the
same as other employees who are similar in their ability or
inability to work by relying on a policy that makes distinctions
based on the source of an employee’s limitations (e.g., a
policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the
job).”); id. at 12 (stating that a rule differentiating pregnancy
from other conditions based on place of injury (on-the-job or
not) is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason).
___________________________________________________________________________
3 The pretext model continues to be useful, however, in cases where the employer
purports to follow a non-discriminatory policy treating pregnancy the same as other
conditions similarly affecting work, but plaintiff proves that the asserted pregnancyneutral reason is actually a pretext for discrimination. See EEOC Guidance, supra, at
12 (giving example where employer explains denial of light-duty to pregnant worker
“based on something other than the source of an employee’s limitation,” such as a
cap on the number of light-duty assignments avail- able, but the plaintiff proves that
the employer has waived that cap for non-pregnant workers).
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Accepting a rule about the source of an employee’s condition
as a legitimate reason for the differential treatment of
pregnancy would be to accept “the very stereotype the law
condemns.” J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 138 (1994)
(quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1990)). Nor is it any
less of a violation of statutory text if the employer, when it
adopted a policy that accommodated other conditions with a
similar effect on work, did so out of neglect as op- posed to a
deliberate, conscious intent to disfavor pregnancy. Unless
justified as a BFOQ, it is an un- lawful employment practice
to treat pregnancy less well than comparable disability,
regardless of the employer’s motive for doing so. See Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. at 199 (“[T]he absence of a malevolent
motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a
neutral policy with a discriminatory effect”).
Courts instead should permit plaintiffs to prove pregnancy
discrimination
directly
by establishing the employer’s
differential treatment of pregnancy compared to other conditions
with a similar effect on work. While the court below opened the
door to proving discrimination directly as an alternative to
the pretext model, it wrongly grafted onto this meth- od a
requirement that the plaintiff provide “direct evidence” of
“animus” against pregnancy. Pet. App. 17a-18a, 24a-25a. This
compounds the error dis- cussed above, turning a determination
of differential treatment into a search for subjective animus. See
EEOC Guidance, supra, at 11 (stating that even without proof
of employer statements evidencing anti-pregnancy animus, “a
pregnant worker may still establish a violation of the PDA by
showing that she was denied light duty or other
accommodations that were granted to other employees who are
similar in the their ability or inability to work.”). Neither the
employer’s reason for treating pregnancy differently nor the
nature of the evidence offered are material. Cf. Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (rejecting a “direct
evidence” requirement in mixed motive cases because the
statute makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct
evidence); see also EEOC Guidance, supra, at 7 (“Pregnant
employees seeking to establish that they have not been treated
the same as other employees similar in their ability or
inability to work can establish unequal treatment through
various forms of evidence.”).
To the law’s detriment, some lower courts, including the
court below, have allowed the proof frameworks to become the
tail that wags the dog. Cf. Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking
Discrimination Law, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 69 (2011) (criticizing
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lower courts’ reflexive use of judicially devised proof frameworks
in lieu of more straightforward applications of statutory text). In
doing so, they have transformed the Second Clause of the PDA
from a clear directive to treat pregnancy at least as well as other
conditions similarly affecting one’s ability to work and into a
search for pregnancy-based animus.
III. THE EXPANSION OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT WILL FURTHER DISMANTLE THE
PDA IF THE COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING IS
ALLOWED TO STAND
The rights guaranteed by the PDA are comparative. The
PDA does not create any absolute entitlement, but makes the
level of treatment due pregnant workers contingent on how the
employer treats non- pregnant workers with conditions similarly
affecting work. As this Court has explained, “Congress intended
the PDA to be a floor beneath which pregnancy disability
benefits may not drop. . . .” Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987). Disregarding this directive,
the ruling below incorrectly – and inexplicably – placed ADAaccommodated individuals outside the realm of comparison for
pregnant workers under the PDA. Pet. App. 18a-19a, 27a. The
court was egregiously wrong in doing so.
Under the PDA, the employer’s reason for re- fusing to
accommodate pregnant workers despite accommodating nonpregnant workers is not material. That some non-pregnant
workers may be accommodated pursuant to another legal
mandate does not remove their treatment as a baseline for
pregnant workers. As this Court made clear in the alternative
holding in Guerra, if the PDA had required identical treatment
of pregnant and non-pregnant workers in that case, employers
could have complied with both the PDA and the California law
mandating maternity leave by extending comparable leaves to
non-pregnant, similarly affected workers. Guerra, 479
U.S. at 290-91. The same reasoning applies to employees
entitled to accommodation under the ADA. See EEOC
Guidance, supra, at 7 (a PDA violation may be established by
“evidence that reasonable accommodations . . . are provided
under the ADA to individuals with disabilities who are similar
to a pregnant worker in terms of their ability or inability to
work.”); id. at 11 (Example 10).
Indeed, it would be nothing less than bizarre for the PDA’s
baseline to depend on whether the employ- er voluntarily
accommodated other conditions or did so solely by force of law.
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In such a universe, voluntary accommodation of disability would
create the obligation to accommodate pregnancy, but the passage
of a disability law would eliminate it. The Second Clause
permits no such shenanigans and simply makes the minimum
level of treatment for pregnant workers depend on the
accommodations available to non- pregnant but similarly
capable workers. Such an approach would also flatly
contradict the PDA’s history, including early applications of the
Act forcing employers to extend to pregnancy those benefits
that they were already required by law to provide to other
conditions similarly affecting work. See Widiss, Gilbert Redux,
supra, at 967-68 (discussing the PDA’s interaction with other
statutory mandates and explaining that the PDA required
“leveling up” for pregnancy, “even if an employer’s exclusion of
pregnancy from disability, health insurance, sick day, or other
policies was due to pregnancy-neutral factors, such as . . .
compliance with other statutory man- dates”); id. at 1019-20
(discussing early EEOC guidance to this effect). The ADA
should not be turned into a sinkhole for pregnant workers.
The lower court’s reasoning, which was troubling under the
original ADA, is even more so after the 2008 Amendments
(“ADAAA”),
which
amended
the ADA
to
require
accommodation of a wider range of disabilities than under
court interpretations of the original ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§12101(2)(A) (2012); see also EEOC Guidance, supra, at 15
(“Congress made clear in the [ADAAA] that the question of
whether an individual’s impairment is a covered disability should
not demand extensive analysis and that the definition of
disability should be construed in favor of broad coverage.”).
The ADAAA and its regulations now require reasonable
accommodations for a broad range of impairments, including
those that substantially limit a person’s ability to lift, walk,
stand or bend, even if such limitations are temporary in
duration. See 42 U.S.C. §12101(2)(A) (2012) (identifying major
life activities for which substantial impairment would qualify
an individual for coverage); 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(i) & (j)(ix) (2012)
(explaining the standard for impairment under the Amendments
and stating that “[t]he effects of an impairment lasting or
expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially
limiting within the meaning of this section”); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. (2012) (similar).
The ADAAA’s expansion of the class of workers entitled to
accommodations should, by virtue of the baseline set in the
PDA, raise the floor for pregnant workers with a similar
ability or inability to work. See EEOC Guidance, supra, at 3
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n.11 (“The expanded definition of ‘disability’ under the ADA also
may affect the PDA requirement that pregnant workers with
limitations be treated the same as employees who are not
pregnant but who are similar in their ability or inability to
work by expanding the number of non- pregnant employees
who could serve as comparators where disparate treatment
under the PDA is alleged.”). If the ADAAA requires
accommodation, for example, for a worker with temporary lower
back pain, a pregnant worker with a similar limitation should
receive the same accommodation. The court below, however,
wrongly concluded that workplace accommodations required
by the ADA are not appropriate comparison points for the
treatment of pregnant workers under the PDA.
If upheld, the lower court’s ruling would give the ADAAA
the “perverse effect of decreasing employers’ obligations to
pregnant employees by reducing significantly the pool of
potential comparators considered under a PDA claim.” Widiss,
Gilbert Redux, supra, at 964-65; see also EEOC Guidance, supra,
at 8 (comparing the kinds of disabling conditions now requiring
reasonable accommodation under the ADAAA to similar effects
on work resulting from pregnancy). A law designed to help one
set of workers with disabilities would then have the shocking and
unintended effect of nullifying the Second Clause of the PDA.
There is nothing in the original or amended ADA to support
this
interpretation,
and
this
Court
has repeatedly
admonished that legislative repeals by implication are strongly
disfavored. See Cook County v. U.S. ex rel. Chandler, 538
U.S. 119, 132 (2003); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 416
(1994); Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936);
see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“ . . .
when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to
the contrary, to regard each as effective.”). This is all the more
true since the two statutes share a common purpose: ensuring
that employees with health conditions are not unreasonably
excluded from the workplace.
The lower court’s confusion in handling the intersection of
the PDA and the ADA stems in part from its incorrect
assumption that the temporary nature of pregnancy makes it
incomparable to lasting disabilities. Pet. App. 27a. However,
nothing in the PDA makes the temporary duration of pregnancy
necessarily incommensurate with such conditions. The similarity
that counts is the effect on an employee’s ability to work. See
Brake & Grossman, supra, at 96-97 (explaining references to
“temporary” disabilities in the PDA’s legislative history). For
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example, an employer may violate the PDA by permitting an
employee with type 2 diabetes but not a pregnant employee to
take frequent snack breaks, even though pregnancy is temporary
and type 2 diabetes is not. The critical inquiry is whether the
employer treated pregnancy less favorably than it treats a nonpregnant worker with a condition having a similar effect on
work.
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH MAKES
THE PDS AN INEFFECTIVE REMEDY FOR WOMEN IN
NEED OF ITS PROTECTION
An undeservedly narrow reading of the PDA will have a
particularly adverse impact on women who most need its
protection: women in non-traditional occupations and lowwage working women.4
The discriminatory denial of accommodations to pregnant
workers impedes sex integration of the labor market, relegating
women to low-wage, female-dominated jobs with little security.
Many jobs remain heavily segregated by sex. Women
already face substantial obstacles to traditionally maledominated jobs, see Ariane Hegewisch & Heidi Hartmann,
Occupational Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap: A Job
Half Done, Institute For Women’s Policy Research at 4-6 (Jan.
2014) (noting that “some of the most common occupations for
either women or men” remain highly segregated). Jobs
traditionally held by women are generally low paying. See U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey (2014) (noting that traditionally
male-dominated jobs pay significantly higher wages than
occupations with a predominantly female workforce); U.S.
Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2012) (comparing, for example, median earnings in male-dominated protective
services occupation of $48,836 with median earnings in femaledominated personal care occupation of $23,141). Thus,
working in traditionally male dominated jobs offers women,
particularly women lacking advanced degrees, a rare avenue to
middle class earnings. The inability to retain a non-traditional
job due to non-accommodation of pregnancy is thus a particularly
grave loss to working class women who have few other
opportunities to earn a living wage for themselves and their
families.
The likelihood of conflicts between pregnancy and work,
however, is particularly pronounced in traditionally maledominated jobs. For example, women in non-traditional
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occupations are particularly susceptible to exposure to
hazardous substances such as chemicals, gas, dust, fumes, or
radiation. See Grossman & Thomas, supra, at 19 (2009) (citing
studies). Pregnant firefighters may face exposure to toxins
contained in fire smoke, including carbon monoxide, benzene
and other irritant and asphyxiate gasses with a potentially
negative impact on fetal health. See Melissa A. McDiarmid et al.,
Reproductive Hazards of Fire Fighting II: Chemical Hazards,
19 Am. J. of Industrial Medicine 447, 451-62 (1991). Nontraditional occupations are also more likely to require
strenuous physical activity, some of which may
be
contraindicated for certain phases of pregnancy. For example,
a seven-months-pregnant police officer may find it challenging
to pursue a suspect in a foot chase. See Karen J. Kruger,
Pregnancy and Policing: Are They Compatible? Pushing the
Legal Limits on Behalf of Equal Employment Opportunities, 22
Wisc. Women’s L.J. 61, 70 (2006). Non-traditional occupations
also frequently involve work conditions that can interfere with
pregnancy, such as irregular hours or night shifts. See Clair
Infante-Rivard et al., Pregnancy Loss and Work Schedule During
Pregnancy, 4 Epidemiology 73 (1993) (concluding that the risk of
preterm delivery is more than twice as high among women who
work night shifts relative to women on fixed day schedules).
Given
these
constraints,
lack
of
pregnancy-related
accommodations can significantly erode women’s ability to
both obtain and retain higher-wage, male-dominated jobs.
Beyond facing a higher risk of conflict between pregnancy
and work, women in non-traditional occupations are also
especially vulnerable to pregnancy discrimination. Although
several studies have found stereotyping and bias against
pregnant employees and applicants, see, e.g., Jane A. Halpert
et al., Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance
Appraisals, 14 J. Org’l Behav. 649 (1993) (finding substantial
negative stereotyping against pregnant workers, resulting in
significantly more negative performance appraisals of pregnant
workers, especially by male reviewers); Michelle Hebl et al.,
____________________________________________________________
4 As used here, the term “non-traditional occupations” encompasses all occupations
where one sex constitutes more than 75 percent of the labor force. See Women’s
Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Nontraditional Occupations of Employed Women in 2010, at
1 n.1 (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/ wb/stats/NontraJobs_2010.htm.

DO NOT DELETE

102

5/19/15 10:55 AM

WOMEN’S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER

[Vol. 36

Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women:
Complementary Interpersonal Punishments and Rewards That
Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. of Applied Pscyh. 1499,
1507 (2007) (finding hostile re- actions to pregnant job
applicants despite benevolent reactions to pregnant customers),
such negative reactions are even stronger when pregnant
applicants pursue jobs traditionally held by men. See Hebl,
supra. Women who enter non-traditional fields are more
likely to encounter entrenched institutional sexism stemming
from doubts about their professional competence. For instance,
women who enter law enforcement “face tremendous
difficulties” because their male colleagues “doubt that women
are equal to men in performing job skills, fear that women
cannot do ‘real’ police work, and have concerns about women’s ‘emotional fitness.’ “ Kruger, supra, at 67; cf. Corina
Schulze,
Institutionalized
Masculinity
in
US
Police
Departments: How Maternity Leave Policies (or Lack Thereof)
Affect Women in Policing, 23 Crim. J. Stud. 177, 179-180 (2010)
(discussing ways in which the police departments’ “masculine
value
system” contributes to the underrepresentation of
women in those departments). Pregnancy heightens these
concerns, increasing women’s risk of being forced out and
making pregnancy-related accommodations both rare and vital
to the women in these jobs.5 It is important to remember that
claims under the Second Clause arise only when an employer
accommodates other physical limitations or injuries but
refuses to provide the same level of support to pregnancy. But if
an employer makes a light-duty position available for a worker
with an injured back, the employer should also be able to
make a light-duty position available for a pregnant employee
with back pain or a lifting restriction.
Regardless of the type of occupation, the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of the PDA is especially harmful to low-income
women, the group Congress was particularly concerned with
when it passed the PDA. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-948, at 3
(1978) (noting that “the assumption that women will become
pregnant and leave the labor force . . . is at the root of the
discriminatory practices which keep women in low- paying and
dead-end jobs”).
Women in low-wage jobs remain highly vulnerable to the
harms of non-accommodation. First, like women in nontraditional occupations, women in low- wage jobs are more likely
to experience conflicts between pregnancy and work because
they work in physically demanding jobs or highly regimented
workplaces. See Grossman, supra, at 578-83. Second, low-wage
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women are less likely to be granted even minor and costless
accommodations and thus more likely to be forced out because
of these conflicts. See Stephanie Bornstein, Poor, Pregnant, and
Fired: Caregiver Discrimination Against Low-Wage Workers,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law Center for
Worklife
Law
(2011),
at
2,
available
at
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/PoorPregnantAndFired.pdf (concluding
that many pregnant low-wage workers are “fired on the spot
or immediately after announcing a pregnancy, . . . banned from
certain positions no matter what their individual capabilities to
do the job, and . . . refused even small, cost-effective adjustments that would allow them to continue with work throughout
their pregnancies”); Paula McDonald et al., Expecting the
Worst: Circumstances Surrounding Pregnancy Discrimination
at Work and Progress to Formal Redress, 39 Indus. Rel. J.
229, 237 (2008) (study finding that most cases of pregnancy
discrimination occurred in low-wage occupations); cf. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48020, at
*1 (D. Kan. July 21, 2009) (store policy barred pregnant
fitting room monitor from carrying a water bottle at work
despite recommendation from doctor). Moreover, given rigid
work schedules with parsimonious leave policies, low-wage
workers find it challenging to take time off for necessary medical
appointments. See Bornstein, supra, at 6 (noting that “less than
one-third of working parents with incomes under $28,000 ha[ve]
access to flexible workplace scheduling”); see also Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States – March
2014
(July
25,
2014),
available
at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf (noting that only 21
percent of workers in the bottom 10 percent of wage-earners have
access to paid sick days). Accordingly, court interpretations that
minimize protections of the PDA exacerbate already difficult
conditions for low-wage working women.

____________________________________________________
5 PDA-related litigation indeed suggests that conflicts tend to arise with particular
frequency in non-traditional occupations. See e.g. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d
637 (6th Cir. 2006) (delivery truck driver); Lehmuller v. Incorporated Village of Sag
Harbor, 944 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (police officer); Dimino v. New York City
Transit Auth., 64 F. Supp. 2d 136 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (transit police officer); Spees v.
James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2010) (welder).
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The plight of a low-income woman segregated out of a higherwage, male-dominated job into the equally strenuous low-wage
one based on her reproductive capacity is far from novel. As
far back as a century ago, pregnancy was the common basis for “
‘protecting’ female employees out of jobs desirable to
males.” Deborah L. Rhode, Speaking of Sex: The Denial of
Gender Inequality 34 (1997). Giving the PDA its due is not just
a matter of doing justice to the plain language of the statute. It
is vital to putting an end to the longstanding unjust treatment
of working women, particularly ones who perform “men’s
jobs,” or who work for low wages.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing
should be reversed.
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Appendix A
The Amici have substantial expertise in employ- ment
discrimination law and issues relating to wom- en’s workplace
equality. Their expertise thus bears directly on the issues
before the Court in this case. These Amici are listed below.
For professors, their institutional affiliations are listed for
identification purposes only.
Organizations
Legal Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund) has been at the national fore- front of the
movement to advance women’s rights for more than forty years.
As part of this work, Legal Momentum has particularly
focused on eliminating unjust barriers to women’s economic
security, such as pregnancy discrimination. To combat pregnancy
discrimination, Legal Momentum advocates through the legal
system and in cooperation with government agencies and policy
makers. In addition, Legal Momentum routinely represents
women working in nontraditional or low-wage jobs who have
been denied light duty positions while pregnant. It is Legal
Momentum’s
position
that
interpreting
the
Pregnancy
Discrimination Act to require employers to accommodate
pregnant workers when such accommodations are available to
other workers is vital to eradicating pregnancy-based workplace
discrimination.
Equal Rights Advocates (ERA) is a national women’s
advocacy organization based in San Francisco, California.
Founded in 1974, ERA’s mission is to protect and expand
economic and educational access and opportunities for women
and girls. ERA employs a three-pronged approach to achieving
its mission: public education, policy advocacy, and litigation.
ERA is committed to assisting working women who face
myriad workplace challenges. In furtherance of that objective,
ERA has been involved in historic impact litigation, including
two of the first pregnancy dis- crimination cases, Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and Richmond Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Berg, 434 U.S. 158 (1977), as well as the more recent
AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701 (2009). ERA’s nationwide multi-lingual hotline serves hundreds of women every year
and helps them navigate these challenges. Calls from workers
facing pregnancy discrimination are on the rise, and ERA has a
strong interest in ensuring that women are adequately protected
by a fair application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) by courts.
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The Maurice and Jane Sugar Law Center for Economic
and Social Justice is a national non- profit law center
extensively engaged in labor and employment law litigation,
including gender and pregnancy discrimination. The Sugar
Law Center is deeply interested in this case because its outcome
affects the right of thousands of women workers employed in
traditionally male workplaces and the ongoing harms
occurring to women workers who become pregnant while
working. The judgment of amici is based on over 15 years
experience in public interest advocacy and representation on
behalf of workers before administrative agencies and federal
and state courts throughout the country. Our experience
includes one of the first cases in the Midwest directly
confronting the issues arising in this case, and is based on a
history and mission of public advocacy that has included
contacts with state and local elected officials who have sought
understanding of the issues before the court in the present
matter.
Public Justice, P.C. (Public Justice) is a national public
interest law firm dedicated to pursuing justice for the victims of
corporate, governmental, and individual wrongdoing. It works
to advance civil rights and civil liberties, employees’ rights,
consumers’ and victims’ rights, environmental protection, access
to justice, and the protection of the poor and the power- less.
Public Justice has prosecuted a wide range of gender
discrimination and workers’ rights cases. It is devoted to
ensuring that women and men are treated equally, that pregnant
and non-pregnant workers are treated equally on the basis of
their ability to work, and that the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act is interpreted to mean what it says.
The Union for Reform Judaism (URJ) including 900
congregations in North America encompassing
1.3 million Reform Jews, the Central Conference of
American Rabbis (CCAR), whose membership includes more
than 2000 Reform rabbis, and the Women of Reform Judaism
that represents more than 65,000 women in nearly 500 women’s
groups in North America and around the world, come to this
issue out of a longtime commitment to asserting the principle,
and furthering the practice, of the full equality of women on
every level of life.
The Women’s Law Project (WLP) is a non-profit public
interest law firm with offices in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Founded in 1974, the WLP is dedicated to
improving the legal and economic status of women and their
families through litigation, public policy initiatives, public
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education, and individual counseling. Throughout its history,
the WLP has worked to eliminate sex discrimination by
bringing and supporting litigation challenging discriminatory
practices prohibited by federal civil rights laws. WLP assists
women who have been victims of pregnancy discrimination in
employment through its telephone counseling service and
through direct legal representation. The WLP has a strong
interest in the proper application of the Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act, to ensure equal treatment in the workplace.
Professors
Barbara Babcock
Judge John Crown Professor of Law
Emerita Stanford Law School
Crown Quadrangle
559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
Deborah L. Brake
Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty
Scholar University of Pittsburgh School of Law
3900 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
Sarah E. Burns Professor of Law
Faculty Director
Carr Center for Reproductive Justice NYU School of Law
245 Sullivan St. 5th Floor
New York, NY 10012
Martha Chamallas
Robert J. Lynn Chair in Law
Moritz College of Law
The Ohio State University
55 W. 12th Ave.
Columbus, OH 43201
Jessica A. Clarke Associate Professor
University of Minnesota Law School
229-19th Avenue S.
Minneapolis, MN 55455
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Jeannette Cox Professor of Law
University of Dayton
300 College Park
Dayton, OH 45469-2772
Deborah Dinner
Associate Professor of Law
Washington University School of Law
Campus Box 1120, One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
Maxine Eichner
Reef Ivey II Professor of Law
UNC School of Law
CB #3380 Van Hecke-Wettach Hall
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3380
Sally Frank
Professor of Law
Drake University School of Law
2621 Carpenter Avenue
Des Moines, IA 50311
Cary Franklin
Assistant Professor
University of Texas School of Law
727 East Dean Keeton St.
Austin, TX 78705
Leon Friedman
Joseph Kushner Distinguished Professor
of Civil Liberties Law
Hofstra Law School
121 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
Tristin Green
Professor of Law & Dean’s Circle Scholar
University of San Francisco School of Law
2130 Fulton Street
San Francisco, CA 94117-1080
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Joanna L. Grossman
Sidney & Walter Siben Distinguished Professor of Family Law
Hofstra Law School
121 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
Grant Hayden
Professor of Law
Maurice A. Deane School of Law
121 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
Jennifer S. Hendricks
Associate Professor
University of Colorado Law School
Wolf Law Building
401 UCB Boulder, CO 80309
Herma Hill Kay
Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law
School of Law (Boalt Hall)
University of California Berkeley,
California 94720
Laura Kessler Professor of Law
University of Utah College of Law
332 South 1400 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
Sylvia A. Law
Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law,
Medicine and Psychiatry
NYU Law School
40 Washington Sq. So., Rm. 429
New York, N.Y. 10012
Marcia McCormick
Associate Professor of Law
Saint Louis University School of Law
3800 Lindell Blvd.
Saint Louis, MO 63108
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Program on Social Entrepreneurship
at Stanford University Stanford Law School
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Georgetown Law School
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